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ATTORNEY FEES-UNITED STATES Is NOT LIABLE FOR ATTORNEY
FEES UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS To JUSTICE ACT By ANALOGY TO
SECTION 1983-Premachandra v. Mitts, 753 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1985).
The Veterans Administration (VA) terminated Dr. Bhartur
Premachandra's employment with the VA as a research scientist. In
addition to dismissing him, the VA ordered Dr. Premachandra to dis-
mantle his laboratory. He appealed his termination to the Merit Sys-
tems Protection Board (MSPB). He also filed a motion for an injunc-
tion in United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri. In his motion, Dr. Premachandra sought to enjoin the VA
from firing him and from requiring him to close his laboratory before
the MSPB could rule on the validity of his discharge. He claimed that
the due process clause of the fifth amendment entitled him to a hearing
prior to his termination and the dismantling of his laboratory. The dis-
trict court denied plaintiff's motion for an injunction, and further de-
nied his motion for an injunction pending appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.1 Plaintiff then made another
motion for an injunction pending appeal, in which he asked to be al-
lowed to keep his laboratory open and to continue his experiments, not-
withstanding the termination of his employment. The VA agreed to
these terms, and the Eighth Circuit entered an order permitting plain-
tiff to keep his laboratory open and to continue his experiments without
pay, pending oral arguments before the court of appeals. The court of
appeals subsequently heard oral arguments on the district court's de-
nial of plaintiff's motion for an injunction. Before the court ruled on
the matter, however, the VA agreed to permit plaintiff to continue to
maintain his laboratory and conduct research until the MSPB could
decide on the merits of his termination.
The MSPB reinstated the plaintiff and the court of appeals ac-
cordingly dismissed his appeal as moot. Plaintiff then successfully
sought an award of attorney's fees from the district court. The court
held that plaintiff had prevailed in the injunction litigation, and was
therefore entitled to recover fees under the provisions of the Equal
Access to Justice Act' and the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
I. Premachandra v. Mitts, 548 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
2. Id. at 120-21. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1982) provides:
Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may'award reasonable fees and expenses
of attorneys . . . to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the
United States or any agency and any official of the United States acting in his or her
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The VA appealed on two separate grounds. First, it contended, the
plaintiff had not "prevailed" in the injunction litigation within the
meaning of the attorneys' fees statutes, since the VA's agreement al-
lowing plaintiff to keep his laboratory open had been voluntary. The
VA's second ground for appeal was that the district court improperly
assessed attorney's fees against the federal government pursuant to the
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The VA argued that the United
States could not be liable for attorneys' fees under the EAJA unless
some "other party" would be liable for fees under a fee-shifting statute
or common law exception." In this case, the VA argued, no such "other
party" existed. Plaintiff's lawsuit involved a claim of violations commit-
ted under color of federal, not state law, and thus no "other party"
would be liable under sections 1983 and 1988. Therefore, the "same
extent" language of the Act did not authorize an award of attorneys'
fees against the United States.
A three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit rejected the VA's argu-
ments and affirmed the district court's award of attorneys' fees. The
official capacity. . . . The United States shall be liable for such fees and expenses to
the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under
the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award.
Section 2412(d)(l)(A) provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing
party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party
in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort) brought by or against the United
States . . . unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substan-
tially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.
Since the court of appeals found that Dr. Premachandra was entitled to attorneys' fees under §
2412(b). it did not consider the applicability of § 2412(d).
3. Premachandra, 548 F. Supp. at 120-21. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) provides in part: "in any
action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [42 U.S.C. § 1983], the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs." (Section 1988 provides for awards of attorneys' fees in actions commenced under other
provisions of the code as well).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects . . . any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
The district court based its award of attorneys' fees on the language in § 2412(b) making the
United States liable for fees to the same extent that other parties would be liable under a fee-
shifting statute. The court construed subsection (b) as making the provisions of § 1988 applicable
to the United States when it acted in a manner which would constitute a violation § 1983 by a
person acting under color of state law.
4. See supra note 2.
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court held that the plaintiff had prevailed, notwithstanding the VA's
"voluntary" compliance. The court further held that the EAJA permits
awards of attorneys' fees in civil rights actions against the United
States to the same extent that a party acting under color of state law
would be liable under section 1988.1
The VA requested and was granted a rehearing en banc.6 On re-
hearing, the Eighth Circuit reversed the panel decision and held that
section 2412(b) does not by analogy to section 1988 authorize awards
of attorneys' fees against the United States. Premachandra v. Mitts,
753 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1985).
Under the English rule, successful parties may recover attorneys'
fees. At common law, fees were not ordinarily recoverable, although
costs of the suit were probably awarded to successful parties in actions
for damages.7 Costs were first expressly provided for by the Statute of
Gloucester in 1275,8 which allowed successful plaintiffs to recover their
costs in certain actions for the possession of real property. The term
"costs" was liberally construed to include attorneys' fees. 9
In 1531, successful defendants were first allowed costs in certain
actions such as trespass, contract, covenant, debt, detinue and ac-
count.1" In 1607, awards of costs to defendants were extended to in-
clude all actions in which plaintiffs could recover costs. Various other
statutes subsequently extended costs to prevailing parties." In 1875,
the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts made the award of costs
discretionary.1 2
Conversely, the American rule generally denies awards of attor-
neys' fees, although statutory and common law exceptions to the rule
do exist. The United States Supreme Court in 1796 first expressed the
American rule in Arcarnbel v. Wiseman.' s The federal courts have con-
sistently followed the rule since then, " except for the short-lived appli-
5. Premachandra v. Mitts, 727 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1984).
6. Id. at 717.
7. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 851 (1929) (quoting 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 597 (2d ed. 1911)).
8. 6 EDW. I. ch. 1 (1275).
9. Goodhart, supra note 7 at 852.
10. 23 HEN. VII. ch. 15 (1531), cited in Goodhart, supra note 7 at 853 & n.23.
II. Goodhart, supra note 7, at 853 & nn.24-26.
12. 36 & 37 VICT. ch. 66 (1873); 38 & 39 VICT. ch. 77 (1875), cited in Goodhart, supra
note 7 at 853 & n.27.
13. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796).
14. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); F.D. Rich
Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., Inc., 417 U.S. 116 (1974); Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
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cation of the "private attorney general" doctrine, discussed below. 5
The courts have advanced three arguments in favor of the American
rule. One argument is that society should not penalize litigants for as-
serting claims or defenses in court, since the outcome of litigation can-
not be known in advance with any certainty.' 6 Another argument is
that the possibility of having to pay opposing counsels' fees would dis-
courage the poor from asserting their legal rights through litigation.17
Finally, proponents of the American rule assert that the additional liti-
gation occasioned by disputes over attorneys' fees would place unac-
ceptable administrative burdens on the judicial system.' 8
Historically, federal statutes created limited exceptions to the
American rule in federal courts. Today, however, federal law permits
only nominal fee awards in the absence of statutory or common law
exceptions.' 9 At the inception of the federal court system, a statute
made fee awards in federal court subject to the prevailing practice in
the state where the court was located.' 0 In 1853, Congress provided a
standardized fee schedule for counsel fees in federal courts." Substan-
tially the same provisions found in the 1853 Act were continued in the
Revised Statutes of 1874, 22 the Judicial Code of 1911, 2' and the Re-
vised Code of 1948.24 The Revised Code of 1948 is the current law and
provides for nominal attorneys' fees, the highest amount being $100.00
in admiralty appeals involving more than $5,000.00. 5 Thus, with the
exception of the nominal fees permitted under section 1923(a), the Su-
preme Court has followed the American rule in disallowing attorneys'
fees against the United States.'6 In 1948, Congress enacted the rule
into statute.' 7
15. See infra notes 32-34, 47-50 and accompanying text.
16. Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 257; Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 717.
20. For a detailed history of early federal statutes on the subject of attorneys' fees, see Aly-
eska, 421 U.S. at 248-56, nn.19-29.
21. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, 10 Stat. 161.
22. Rev. Stat. §§ 823, 824 (1874).
23. Judicial Code, 36 Stat. 1169 § 297 (1911), cited in Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 255.
24. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 955-56 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920
& 1923 (1982)), cited in Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 255-56, nn.28-29.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1923(a)(1982).
26. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 257.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1978), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982). The current section
2412 contains the EAJA. Prior to the passage of EAJA, section 2412 provided in pertinent part
that "a judgment for costs ... not including the fees and expenses of attorneys may be awarded
to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States. .. "
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In addition to the statutory exception found in section 1923(a), the
federal judiciary has recognized common law exceptions to the Ameri-
can rule. These are the "common fund" or "common benefit" excep-
tion, and the "bad faith" exception. The United States Supreme Court
in 1882 recognized the "common benefit" exception as part of the
courts' historical equity powers. 8 The exception permits a court to
award attorneys' fees to one whose lawsuit benefits others as well as
himself. In such cases, the successful party may recover fees out of a
fund his suit has preserved or from the parties whom the litigation has
benefitted. 9 A court may also assess fees against a losing party who
has "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive rea-
sons." 30 In addition, a court may require a party to pay attorneys' fees
for "willful disobedience of a court order . . . as part of the fine to be
levied on the defendant. '31
Congress has supplemented the common law exceptions by enact-
ing various statutes that include fee-shifting provisions designed to en-
courage enforcement of the law through suits by private parties. Con-
gress has often used this "private attorney general" approach to assist
in implementing legislation on matters of important public policy.3 2 An
example is the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976, 33
which provides for attorneys' fees to prevailing parties other than the
United States in actions to enforce various provisions of the federal
civil rights laws.3 4
28. Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund of Florida v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527
(1881) (bondholder whose suit benefitted other bondholders by preventing trustee from wasting or
misapplying funds in trust securing bonds entitled to counsel fees payable from trust fund).
29. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973) (suit by members against union to vindicate
free speech rights guaranteed by federal labor statute benefitted both union and members, enti-
tling plaintiffs to attorneys' fees); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (share-
holders who established violation of securities laws by corporation benefitted both corporation and
other shareholders held entitled to fees); Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939)
(trust beneficiary who established right to lien on funds in receivership established by stare decisis
same right for others in her position).
For Arkansas cases recognizing the "common fund doctrine," see Crittenden County v. Wil-
liford, 283 Ark. 289, 675 S.W.2d 631 (1984) (taxpayer awarded fees in successful suit against
county to recover misappropriated funds); Powell v. Henry, 267 Ark. 484, 592 S.W.2d 107 (1980)
(fees awarded in class action by electrical ratepayers for refunds of improper charges); Marlin v.
Marsh & Marsh, 189 Ark. 1157, 76 S.W.2d 965 (1934) (fees awarded stockholders of savings
and loan association whose suit benefitted other stockholders).
30. F.D. Rich Co., 417 U.S. at 129.
31. Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923).
32. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4984, 4987.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See supra note 3.
34. Id. For a discussion of § 1988, see Note, The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of
1985-861
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The courts do not require a party to actually win a suit on its
merits in order to qualify as a "prevailing party" under section 1988
and other fee-shifting statutes. 35 For example, a party may recover fees
after obtaining a favorable settlement.3 6 Or, a defendant may recover
after the plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed an unmeritorious action.
37
A plaintiff may be entitled to fees even though he does not prevail on
every issue.38 A fee may be awarded when an interlocutory appeal was
"sufficiently significant and discrete to be treated as a separate unit. '39
A final judgment is not necessarily a prerequisite to an award of fees.' 0
The First Circuit expressed the foregoing principles in the form of
a two-part test in Nadeau v. Helgemoe.'1 The plaintiffs in Nadeau
were prisoners who sued officials of the New Hampshire State Prison
under section 1983, seeking greater access to library facilities and an
improvement in prison conditions. Plaintiffs successfully litigated the
library issue and entered into a consent judgment with the defendants
that resulted in improved prison conditions. The First Circuit held that
the plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees if the district court found
on remand that plaintiffs had satisfied both prongs of the test."2 Under
the first prong of the test, the court must factually determine whether
the litigation was a catalyst in bringing about the relief sought by the
plaintiff.43 The second prong required a legal determination of whether
1976-The Amount of Success Determines the Award, 7 U.A.L.R. L.J. 421 (1984).
35. The standards for awarding attorneys' fees are generally the same "in all cases in which
Congress has authorized an award of fees to a 'prevailing party.' " Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
424, 433 n. 7 (1983); Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 n.4 (1980) (per curiam).
36. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980) (action to enforce rights under AFDC program
concluded through settlement); United Handicapped Federation v. Andre, 622 F.2d 342 (8th Cir.
1980) (suit by handicapped plaintiffs alleging inadequate transportation facilities dismissed pursu-
ant to settlement); Williams v. Miller, 620 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1980) (action alleging sex discrimi-
nation dismissed by plaintiff after rendered moot by defendant's voluntary compliance).
37. Corcoran v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 121 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1941) (com-
plaint dismissed by plaintiff after court order granting motion by defendant for a more particular
statement).
38. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970) (plaintiff in
class action who failed to establish personal right to damages or injunction entitled to recover fees
for establishing that employer discriminated against blacks generally). But see Hensley, 461 U.S.
424, 440 (hours spent by attorney on unsuccessful claims unrelated to successful claims excluded
from computation of fee award).
39. Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 1974) (defendant-em-
ployer entitled to fees for successfully opposing EEOC appeal of order limiting its intervention in
discrimination suit).
40. Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 722 (1974) (final order in school
desegregation case need not be entered prior to fee award).
41. 581 F.2d 275 (Ist Cir. 1978).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 279. Accord Hensley, 461 U.S. 424.
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the suit was so "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless" as to render the
defendant's compliance gratuitous, that is, not required by law.44 If so,
then the plaintiff is not a "prevailing party," and cannot recover attor-
neys' fees.45 The Eighth Circuit adopted the Nadeau test in United
Handicapped Federation v. Andre."
Perhaps taking a cue from congressional attempts to implement
important public policies by means of fee-shifting statues, the federal
courts began to apply the "private attorney general" doctrine even in
the absence of specific fee-shifting statutes or common law excep-
tions. 47 The Supreme Court struck down that practice, however, in Aly-
eska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society." The Court held that
28 U.S.C. section 24129 expressly barred fee awards against the
United States absent some specific statutory authorization.50
Another bar to the recovery of fees against the United States is
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity precludes
suits against the United States unless Congress waives the immunity.5 2
The courts strictly construe asserted acts of waiver.53
As a partial response to the holding in Alyeska.barring fee awards
against the United States,54 Congress passed the Equal Access to Jus-
tice Act."5 The purpose of the EAJA is to put the United States on an
44. Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 281 (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S.
412, 422 (1978)).
45. Id.
46. 622 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1980); see supra note 36.
47. See, e.g., Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219 (lst Cir. 1974); Cornist v. Richland Parish School
Bd., 495 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1974).
48. 421 U.S. 240, 263. (1975).
49. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
50. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 265-68.
51. Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1983). For a discussion of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity generally, see Note, Federal Tort Claims Act-Feres Doctrine Bars Post-
Discharge Failure to Warn Claim, 6 U.A.L.R. L.J. 445, 446-59 (1983).
52. Note, supra note 51, at 449.
53. Id.
54. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 4985.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982). See supra note 2. For more thorough discussion of the Act's
provisions, see Cromwell, A Substantial Paradox: Attorney's Fees Under the Equal Access to
Justice Act in Social Security Appeals, 7 U.A.L.R. L.J. 355 (1984); Kramer & Shapiro, Recov-
ering Fees from the Government, I 0(!) LITIGATION 25 (1983); Simmons, The "Equal Access to
Justice Act ": Private Enforcement of Public Contract Law, 12 PUBLIC CONTRACT L.J. 284
(1982); Watkins, A Statutory Primer: Attorneys' Fees Against the U.S. Under the Equal Access
to Justice Act, 1983 ARKANSAS LAW NOTES 77; Note, Will the Sun Rise Again for the Equal
Access to Justice Act?, 48 BROOKLYN L. REV. 265 (1982); Note, The Equal Access to Justice
Act in the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1089 (1984); Note, Civil Procedure-Attorney's
Fees-Recovery of Attorney's Fees Against the United States-The Equal Access to Justice Act,
1985-86]
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equal footing with other litigants,56 and to ensure that individuals and
small businesses are not deterred from "seeking review of, or defending
against unreasonable governmental action because of the expense in-
volved in securing the vindication of their rights. 57
However, the Act does not make clear under what circumstances a
successful litigant may recover attorney's fees against the United
States under section 2412(b). That section makes the Unites States lia-
ble for attorneys' fees "to the same extent as any other party" under
the common law or a fee-shifting statute. However, the words "to the
same extent as any other party" are ambiguous. This language could
mean that the United States should be liable for attorneys' fees when-
ever another party, engaging in similar conduct under color of state
law, would be liable for fees under section 1988. Opponents of this ar-
gument point out that sections 1983 and 1988 cannot be directly ap-
plied to any "other party" in actions for violations of a plaintiff's rights
committed under color of federal law." Section 1983 by its terms ap-
plies only to violations committed under color of state law. Inasmuch as
no "other party" (such as a state official) would actually be liable when
only federal action has occurred, section 2412(b) can be read to mean
that the United States should not be liable either.
At the time that Premachandra came before the Eighth Circuit,
the federal district courts were divided on this question. In United
States v. Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines,59 the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois held that section 2412(b) did not
authorize an award of attorneys' fees against the United States in an
action for violation of first amendment rights. Since the action was
based directly on the Constitution, and not on section 1983, the plain-
tiff was not permitted to invoke the provisions of 42 U.S.C. section
1988. While the suit was analogous to a section 1983 action, the com-
plaint did not allege any deprivation of rights under color of state law.
Therefore, had the defendants been anyone other than federal officials,
no other party would be liable. Thus the United States was held not
liable "to the same extent."'60 The court rejected the plaintiff's argu-
10 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 723 (1983); Note, The Award of Attorney's Fees Under the Equal Access
to Justice Act, I I HOFSTRA L. REV. 307 (1982).
56. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4987.
57. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4984; see also Berman v.
Schweiker, 713 F.2d 1290, 1295-96 (7th Cir. 1983).
58. See Premachandra v. Mitts, 753 F.2d at 637.
59. 541 F. Supp. 122 (N.D. III. 1982).
60. Id. at 128.
[Vol. 8:61
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ment that the purpose of the EAJA, to place the government on an
"equal footing" with private litigants, would be effected by an award of
fees based upon an analogy to section 1988. The court reasoned that
the plaintiff's reading of section 2412(b) would not put the United
States on an equal footing with other parties. Private parties would not
be liable to a plaintiff for attorneys' fees for committing "garden vari-
ety" 61 torts which, if committed by the federal government, would be
constitutional violations. Therefore, according to Judge Shadur, the
plaintiff's interpretation of section 2412(b) would render the govern-
ment "less equal" than private parties.6 2
Judge Shadur next considered the testimony of Armand Derfner
of the Lawyers Committee For Civil Rights Under Law before the
House subcommittee drafting the EAJA. Originally, the bill read,
"[tihe United States shall be liable [for fees] to the same extent that a
private party would be liable. .. .
Mr. Derfner testified:
These bills say that the United States should pay fees . . . in those
circumstances where the court may award such fees in suits involving
private parties.
That doesn't say state or local government, but if the language
were amended to read, "in those circumstances where the court may
award such fees in suits involving other litigants" it would achieve
that purpose. And I think it would go even further toward putting the
United States on a par with other governmental bodies.64
Without explanation, the bill's authors subsequently substituted the
words "any other party" in place of "a private party." 5
Judge Shadur recognized that this change could indicate a desire
to impose liability for attorneys' fees upon the United States by incor-
porating the provisions of section 1983 into the EAJA. Nonetheless, he
wrote, "[airguable congressional intent must give way to unambiguous
congressional language." 6 Significant problems would arise from a
contrary result, he thought:
61. Id. at n.5.
62. Id. at 127-28.
63. Id. at 128 (quoting Hearings on S. 265 Before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Administration of Justice, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 9 (1980) [Hereinafter cited
as Hearings].
64. Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines, 541 F. Supp at 128-29 (quoting Hearings,
supra note 63, at 100).




Where the challenged action is one exclusively committed to the fed-
eral government under "Our Federalism" . . . multiple fictions are
involved: We must posit state action of the same nature, then hypoth-
esize the imposition of fees against the state under a Section 1983
lawsuit attacking that action, then saddle the United States with an
equivalent liability though it could not be sued under Section 1983.7
Two other federal district courts followed Miscellaneous Porno-
graphic Magazines in denying attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs
under similar circumstances.6 8 However, in Lauritzen v. Secretary of
the Navy,69 federal district Judge Tashima took the opposite view. The
change in the wording of the Act following Mr. Derfner's testimony 70
convinced Judge Tashima that Congress intended to make the United
States liable for attorneys' fees in civil rights suits under the terms of
section 1988.1 The judge asserted also that his interpretation harmo-
nized with the EAJA's underlying policy of encouraging individuals
and small businesses to challenge unreasonable conduct by the
government.72
The district court in Premachandra73 joined Lauritzen in allowing
attorneys' fees, and by the time Premachandra reached the Eighth Cir-
cuit, only one other federal circuit had ruled on the question posed by
the troublesome language of section 2412(b).7 4
After first determining that the plaintiff was a prevailing party
within the meaning of the EAJA,7 5 the court of appeals turned its at-
67. Id. at n.7.
68. Unification Church v. I.N.S., 574 F. Supp. 93 (D.D.C. 1983) affd, No. 83-2238 (D.C.
Cir. June 4, 1985) (fees under §§ 2412(b) and 1988 denied plaintiff church for successful chal-
lenge to deportation proceedings against church members); Venus v. Goodman, 556 F. Supp. 514
(W.D. Wis. 1983) (fees denied prevailing plaintiff in suit against federal prison officials).
69. 546 F. Supp. 1221 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (fees awarded servicewoman in civil rights action
against Navy) rev'd, sub nom Lauritzen v. Lehman, 736 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1984).
70. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
71. Lauritzen, 546 F. Supp. at 1228.
72. Id. at 1228. Accord Clemente v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 1150 (C.D. Cal. 1983)
(civilian plaintiff entitled to fees in employment discrimination action against Air Force).
73. 548 F. Supp 117 (E.D. Mo. 1982).
74. Saxner v. Benson, 727 F.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1984). Saxner was decided only shortly before
Premachandra, and was not cited therein.
75. The court applied the two-pronged Nadeau test. See supra notes 41-46 and accompany-
ing text. The requirements of the first prong of the test were easily met, as the VA did not dispute
that plaintiffis suit served as a catalyst in keeping his laboratory open. The VA asserted, however,
that plaintiff's suit was unreasonable as a matter of law, and therefore did not pass the second
prong of the Nadeau test. This was established, the VA argued, by the district court's denial of
plaintiff's claim for a pre-dismantling hearing and the Eighth Circuit's rejection of his motion for
an injunction pending appeal. The VA asserted that in permitting plaintiff to keep his lab open
pending the litigation and MSPB hearing, it was engaging in a mere "gratuitous litigating cour-
[Vol. 8:61
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tention to the issue of whether section 2412(b) would permit Prema-
chandra to recover his attorneys' fees. The court accepted the plaintiff's
contention that such an award was consistent with the purpose of the
EAJA. 76 The court also compared the Act's provision of fee awards on
the basis of other fee-shifting statutes to the provision for fees based on
the common law exceptions. No one had suggested, wrote Judge Floyd
R. Gibson, that the provision in the Act subjecting the government to
liability under the common law "bad faith" exception, for instance,
would only be effective when some "other party" to the litigation had
acted in bad faith as well.77 The United States would be liable for fees
if it acted in bad faith, "regardless of whether. . . similar conduct was
committed in the same suit" by other parties.7 8 The court found it logi-
cal, then, that the provision relating to fee-shifting statutes should be
interpreted in the same way: the federal government should be liable
for fees whenever it engages in conduct which would subject state offi-
cials to fee awards under section 1988.79 While conceding that the stat-
ute is ambiguously written, the court said that "Congress' lack of preci-
sion in drafting legislation should never be an instrument for defeating
or frustrating the manifest purpose and intent of Congress, as revealed
by the legislative history."8 Armend Derfner's testimony before the
House subcommittee and the subsequent change in the wording of the
Act indicated to the court that Congress intended to apply the provi-
sions of sections 1983 and 1988 to the federal government.8
The court next addressed the VA's argument that such a reading
of section 2412(b) would "swallow up" the more lenient provisions of
section 2412(d), which permits the government to escape liability if the
court finds that its position was "substantially justified."82 Judge Gib-
son reasoned that his construction of section 2412(b) would not swal-
low up section 2412(d), since the latter was designed to include many
causes of action not analogous to section 1983.83 Furthermore, he ex-
plained, the Eighth Circuit has construed section 1983 as providing a
tesy" without conceding that plaintiff's suit had any legal merit. Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 722.
The court rejected these arguments and held that plaintiff's suit was not "so frivolous, ground-
less, and unreasonable" that the VA's voluntary compliance was merely gratuitous. Id.
76. Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 724-25. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text; see
infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
77. Id. at 726.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 726-27.
80. Id. at 727.
81. Id. at 728-29.
82. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1982).
83. Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 730.
1985-861
UALR LAW JOURNAL
cause of action for only those violations of rights "akin to fundamental
rights protected by the fourteenth amendment."84 Thus, many causes
of action would remain in which section 1983 could not be applied
analogously, and opportunities for the United States to raise the "sub-
stantial justification" defense would still remain.
While recognizing the EAJA as a waiver of sovereign immunity,
and therefore subject to strict construction,85 the court decided that the
legislative history and purpose of the Act indicated Congress "waived
the government's sovereign immunity for cases like this one." 86
The next development in the debate over the correct interpretation
of section 2412(b) came with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Lauritzen
v. Lehman.8 7 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's award of
fees, and rejected the reasoning of the panel in Premachandra. Judge
Sneed, writing for the majority, discounted Derfner's testimony, noting
his reluctance to "pick up bits and scraps of legislative history to aid
interpretation .. ."88
The Lauritzen opinion also raised the "swallow up" argument,
which the panel in Premachandra had rejected: "[n]early every case
alleging a constitutional or statutory violation by the federal govern-
ment could be characterized as analogous to an imaginary section 1983
action." 89 Thus, the federal government would never be able to success-
fully assert that its position was substantially justified, as section
2412(d) permits, since the prevailing plaintiff could always request fees
under 2412(b).
In his partial dissent to the majority opinion of the court of ap-
peals in Lauritzen, Judge Boochever argued that the change in the act
following Derfner's testimony could only signify an intent to incorpo-
rate sections 1983 and 1988:
Of all the statutes mentioned in section 1988 ...only section 1983
differentiates between states and "private parties," because only sec-
84. Id. (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minn., 636 F.2d
195, 198 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981)). This may be too restrictive a view,
however, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) ("§
1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law").
But see Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. 1
(1981) (section 1983 remedy not available for enforcement of federal statutes that contain com-
prehensive remedial schemes).
85. Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 731; Monark Boat Co. v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir.
1983). See also supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
86. Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 729.
87. 736 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1984).
88. Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 555.
89. Id. at 557.
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tion 1983 requires parties to act under color of state law before liabil-
ity may attach.
In order to avoid the logical conclusion that [the EAJA] was
amended to impose fees in these actions, however, the majority con-
strues the amendment in an unrealistic manner. The majority con-
cludes the amendment merely removes sovereign immunity as a bar to
fees awards "where the government is found liable under a substan-
tive provision that would authorize a fee award against a state." ...
The majority, however, cites no "substantive provision" other than
section 1983 that distinguishes between states and individuals. The
original version of [the EAJA], therefore, removed the sovereignty
bar to fee awards in all cases except those arising under section 1983,
because "private parties" could be liable under all of the other stat-
utes named in section 1988.90
Judge Boochever criticized the majority's view that the amend-
ment to the Act only permitted fee awards against the federal govern-
ment in those cases in which federal officials had acted under color of
state law, as opposed to federal law. Such instances are rare, he noted,
since "[flederal officials usually act under color of federal law and sel-
dom act to deprive a party of constitutional rights under color of state
law."91
The dissent also disagreed with the majority's assertion that sub-
section (b) would negative the "substantial justification" defense in
subsection (d). Although the courts are limited in their discretion to
deny attorneys' fees to successful 1983 plaintiffs, they need not always
award fees pursuant to section 1988.92 Thus, the courts would have as
much discretion to deny fees for marginal claims under section 2412(b)
as they do under section 1988. To that extent, 2412(b) would not swal-
low up 2412(d). 3
Shortly after Lauritzen, Premachandra came up before the Eighth
Circuit for an en banc rehearing. The Eighth Circuit reversed the
panel's holding that section 2412(b) permitted awards of attorneys'
fees against the federal government by analogy to section 1983.11
By the time the court rendered its decision on rehearing, it was
able to state that the VA's position was the majority view. 5 The court
90. Id. at 562 (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 564.
93. Id.
94. Premachandra v. Mitts, 753 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1985).
95. Id. at 637 (citing Holbrook v. Pitt, 748 F.2d 1168 (7th Cir. 1984); Lauritzen, 736 F.2d
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reasoned that since Premachandra had not alleged that the VA had
acted under color of state law, no section 1988 liability existed. Thus,
no statute would specifically provide for attorneys' fees, making section
2412(b) inapplicable.96
As an aid to interpreting subsection (b), the court looked to "the
context in which section 2412(b) appears."97 The court reasoned that
Premachandra's reading of subsection (b) would negate the "substan-
tially justified" and "special circumstances" exception to federal liabil-
ity provided in subsection (d). 98
The court recognized that the limitations it had placed on section
1983 actions in prior cases would bar most plaintiffs who sue the fed-
eral government from asserting a right to attorneys' fees by analogy to
section 1988. 99 Nonetheless, the court focused on the state of the law at
the time section 1988 was enacted in 1980: "section 1983 meant what
it says: causes of action could be based on violations of federal law by
officials acting under color of state law."' 100 In support of this interpre-
tation, the court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Maine v.
Thiboutot,10 which held that the application of section 1983 was not
limited to violations of civil rights or equal protection laws. The en
banc majority in Premachandra cited Justice Powell's dissent, in which
he asserted that the decision in Maine would provide a cause of action
under section 1983 for a violation of "any federal statutory right."102 If
that were so, reasoned the court in Premachandra, "parties could read-
ily bypass the 'substantially justified' requirement and evade the other
substantive limits in subsection (d) under Premachandra's theory."10
The court rejected Judge Boochever's dissenting argument in Lauritzen
that the discretionary nature of subsection (b) would prevent it from
swallowing up the substantial justification defense in subsection (d). 10"
Even though subsection (b) grants a court discretion in awarding fees,
550 (9th Cir. 1984); Saxner v. Benson, 727 F.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1984); Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 589 F.Supp. 921 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Unification Church v. I.N.S., 574
F.Supp. 93 (D.D.C. 1983); Venus v. Goodman, 556 F.Supp. 514 (W.D. Wis. 1983); United States
v. Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines, 541 F. Supp. 122 (N.D. 111. 1982)).
96. Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 637.
97. Id. at 638.
98. Id.
99. See supra note 84 and accompanying text; see also Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. I, 15 (1981).
100. Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 638.
101. 448 U.S. I (1980).
102. Id. at I I (Powell, J., dissenting).
103. Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 639.
104. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
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the court must award fees under section 1988 unless special circum-
stances would make an award of fees unjust, under the Supreme
Court's holding in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.105 That
standard, noted the court, is much easier for a plaintiff to satisfy than
to show a lack of substantial justification for the government's
position. 106
The court next addressed Premachandra's argument that the legis-
lative history of section 2412(b) evidenced a congressional intent to ap-
ply the terms of section 1988 against the United States. Although the
court found that the language of the Act and the relationship between
subsections (b) and (d) provided sufficient bases for its opinion, it none-
theless explored the legislative history in order "to meet the panel's
findings and the contention that the result we reach is inconsistent with
congressional intent."10 7
The majority found Derfner's testimony and the subsequent
change in the Act undeterminative. First, no statement linked the
amendment to Derfner's testimony. The legislative history indicated the
Conference Committee's belief that "at a minimum, the United States
should be held to the same standards in litigating as private parties."108
This reference to private parties led the court to conclude that an infer-
ence of an intent to place the United States government in a position of
parity with state governments was unwarranted. 109
Furthermore, the court noted a disparity between Derfner's sug-
gested amendment and the language of the bill as passed. The original
bill provided for fees "in those circumstances in which the court may
award fees in such suits involving private parties." 10 The bill in its
final form eliminated the word "circumstances." The majority took this
omission as another indication that the United States should not be
liable for fees whenever the circumstances could support an analogy to
section 1988."'
The majority concluded its opinion by invoking the doctrine of
strict construction of waivers of sovereign immunity. Congress could
have easily clarified any intention to make the United States liable for
fees in cases involving deprivations of federal rights. Its failure to spe-
105. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
106. Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 639 n.3.
107. Id. at 639-40.
108. Id. at 640 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1434 at 25, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. and AD.
NEWS 5003, 5014).
109. Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 640.
110. Id. (quoting Hearings, supra note 60, at 230-31).
III. Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 640-41.
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cifically do so cast enough doubt on the meaning of the Act to require
strict construction, said the court, and strict construction required a
resolution of those doubts in the government's favor."'
Premachandra did not come away from the court's en banc deci-
sion totally empty-handed, however. He had raised the argument that
the government acted in bad faith, thus entitling him to attorneys' fees
under EAJA's provision for common law exceptions. 1 3 The court
agreed that the district court should have an opportunity to decide that
issue, and remanded the case for a determination of the VA's liability
for fees under the common law." 4
Judge Floyd R. Gibson, author of the panel opinion, was joined by
Judge Heaney in a dissent. Judge Gibson based his dissent on the rea-
soning in his panel opinion, but wrote to express his perception of the
weaknesses of the majority opinion.1 5
Judge Gibson criticized the majority's argument that Premachan-
dra's reading of section 2412(b) would negate the "substantially justi-
fied" and "special circumstances" defenses to fee liability in section
2412(d). He argued that the majority's interpretation effectively read
out of the EAJA the "same extent" language in subsection (b), by al-
lowing the federal government to escape fee liability for unconstitu-
tional acts which would render state officials liable for fees." 6 While
recognizing that a waiver of sovereign immunity should be strictly con-
strued, Judge Gibson argued that the EAJA was a remedial statute,
and should therefore not be so strictly construed as to unduly restrict
recovery. 117
The dissent also took issue with the majority's contention that con-
gressional silence in response to Derfner's testimony was an indication
of support for the majority's position. The amendment was a "signifi-
cant response to Derfner's suggestion."' 8 Judge Gibson noted that if
the final version of the Act did embody Derfner's proposal, "then one
would not [expect] the amendment to be surrounded by a great deal of
discussion."' 9
Finally, the dissent noted the overall purpose of the EAJA of re-
moving the economic barriers to litigation over governmental violations
112. Id. at 641.
113. 28 U.S.C. 2412(b) (1982). See also supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
114. Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 642.
115. Id. (Gibson, J., dissenting).






of citizens' rights. The majority, wrote Judge Gibson, simply disre-
garded that intent. Federal officials are consequently left "as free...
to violate the constitutional rights of citizens as they were before the
EAJA was enacted. What then, could have been the purpose of enact-
ing this waiver of sovereign immunity? 1 20
The panel decision in Premachandra, reversed by the full court,
was a common sense approach to resolving the ambiguity embodied in
section 2412(b). The panel appropriately focused its inquiry upon the
conduct of governmental actors rather than upon their identities. The
en banc decision permits a plaintiff who prevails in a section 1983-type
action against the United States to obtain attorneys' fees only in cer-
tain limited instances. A plaintiff could recover fees in a case in which
federal officials have acted under color of state law so as to bring them-
selves directly within the ambit of section 1983.21 Or, a plaintiff could
recover fees against the United States when a federal official has acted
in concert with state officials in violating rights enforceable under sec-
tion 1983.122 Only in those situations, under the court's ruling, would
EAJA make the United States liable for fees "to the same extent" that
any other party (i.e., one acting under color of state law) would be
liable under sections 1983 and 1988.
The court's reliance on the "swallow up" argument does not
square with the limitations placed on section 1983 actions. Even in the
Ninth Circuit where Lauritzen was decided, not every violation of a
federal statute gives rise to a cause of action under section 1983.123 As
the majority in Lauritzen noted, "we have recently held that a section
1983 action for statutory violations exists only if Congress intended the
statute to create rights for the special benefit of the class to which
plaintiffs belong." 24 As noted above, the Eighth Circuit has limited
recovery under section 1983 to violations of statutory rights akin to
fundamental rights protected by the fourteenth amendment. 125 When a
plaintiff is unable to prevail on a section 1983 claim because of such
120. Id. at 644.
121. For a recent case in which the United States was found liable for fees under §§ 2412(b)
and 1988, see Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 735 F.2d 895
(5th Cir. 1984). The government's liability was predicated on its violation of plaintiffs' rights
under color of state, as opposed to federal law. The court declined to reach the question of
whether the United States is liable under § 2412(b) when it violates a plaintiff's rights under color
of. federal law only.
122. See Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 729 & n.15 (panel opinion).
123. Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 564 (Boochever, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124. Lauritzen, 736 F.2d at 557 n.8.
125. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minn., 636 F.2d 195 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1981).
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limitations, but nonetheless prevails on another theory, the government
will not be foreclosed from asserting the substantial justification de-
fense provided by 2412(d). In summary, while section 2412(b) does
have a dampening effect on the "substantial justification" defense, it
does not entirely swallow up the defense.
Another aspect of Premachandra that is open to question is the
court's use of the doctrine of strict construction of waivers of sovereign
immunity. One noted authority on statutory construction points out
that the doctrine "should be liberally relaxed where the demands of a
contrary policy include the government within the purpose and intend-
ment of a statute. . . . [A] contrary policy is indicated where the in-
clusion of a particular activity within the meaning of the statute would
not vitally interfere with the processes of government." '126 The courts
have limited the scope of section 1983 in a manner that would limit its
usefulness to plaintiffs claiming fees under 2412(b). In the Eighth Cir-
cuit, for instance, section 1983 could only be used to support a fee
claim under EAJA in cases involving serious encroachments upon Con-
stitutional or fundamental rights.12 7 Thus, it cannot be said that awards
of attorneys' fees in those few successful section 1983-type claims
would vitally interfere with governmental functions. In fact, the func-
tioning of the government could only be improved by such an incentive
to avoid conduct which violates its citizens' most basic and valued
rights.
The court's application of the strict construction doctrine to
2412(b) led it to a result that is arguably anomalous. 128 As the major-
ity noted, its decision precluded fees against the United States under
section 1988 only for acts falling within the ambit of section 1983. Fed-
eral actors may still be liable for violations of the other statutes listed
in section 1988, which do not require state action.129 Thus, the United
States could be liable for fees if, for example, it prevents a plaintiff
from entering into contracts,1 30 or exercising property rights. 31 It is
perhaps anomalous to suggest that Congress intended to expose the
government to fee liability for those violations, but not for infringe-
126. 3 C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 62.02 at 72 (4th ed. 1974).
127. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
128. See Giordano v. City Comm'n of Newark, 2 N.J. 585, 67 A.2d 454 (1949) (rule that
abrogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed not applied where literal interpreta-
tion would lead to absurd or anomalous results); Vedutis v. Tesi, 135 N.J. Super. 337, 343 A.2d
171 (1975) (same).
129. Premachandra, 753 F.2d at 641 n.7.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982).
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ments of constitutional or other statutory rights encompassed in section
1983. Nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress in-
tended to make that distinction. On the contrary, the language of the
act, with its broad reference to any other party, would seem to indicate
that parity with state officials was contemplated. 132 The Premachandra
holding hampers the intent of Congress to put the United States on an
"equal footing" with other litigants by removing the financial disincen-
tive to contesting unreasonable government conduct. One of the pur-
poses of the American rule is to ensure that parties will not be discour-
aged from litigating their rights in court.133 Congress has recognized,
however, that the American rule often defeats its underlying purposes,
especially where the government is a party to the litigation. 3" The gov-
ernment has greater litigating expertise and resources at its disposal
than do most citizens and small businesses. If the cost of challenging
the government's action is too high, "a party has no realistic choice and
no effective remedy."' 3 5 Congress found this state of affairs aggravated
by the expanding influence of government regulations in modern Amer-
ican life.' 36 When compliance with the government's position is brought
about because the affected citizens are unable to afford a court chal-
lenge, then precedent may be set by coercion rather than by a carefully
considered judicial opinion informed by opposing viewpoints.' Con-
gress enacted the EAJA to overcome these ills. One has difficulty imag-
ining how that purpose could be fully effected by the holding in Prema-
chandra. The majority's decision severely restricts successful plaintiffs'
ability to recover attorneys' fees against the federal government for vio-
lations of their constitutional rights. That restriction discourages the
private challenges to unreasonable government conduct that Congress
intended to encourage.
The pervasiveness of federal statutes and regulations enhances the
danger that governmental abuse of constitutional and federal statutory
rights is highest when federal officials act under color of federal law.
Congress intended the EAJA to help citizens combat unreasonable gov-
ernment conduct. No conduct by the government could be more unrea-
132. See Curry v. Block, Civ. A. No. 281-037 (S.D. Ga., May 6, 1985) (available on
WESTLAW, DCT Database) (State officials are possible "other parties" to actions for violations
of federal statutory rights; United States liable to same extent).
133. See supra notes 16 & 17 and accompanying text.
134. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 4988.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 9-10, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4988.
137. Id. at 10, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4988.
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sonable in a democratic society than the violation of its citizens' consti-
tutional rights. The en banc decision in Premachandra construes
section 2412(b) so as to prohibit awards of fees to parties who vindicate
their constitutional rights in actions against the United States. As a
result, the congressional intent to encourage such challenges has been
thwarted.
David Schoen
